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INFORMATION SECURITY INVESTMENT IN PREVENTION
AND DETECTION REGIMES – TOWARDS AN AGGREGATE
ECONOMIC MODEL
Tridib Bandyopadhyay
Kennesaw State University
tbandyop@kennesaw.edu

Abstract
Organizations invest in perimeter hardening as well as intrusion detection systems, but often
under stand alone decision frameworks. This could mean suboptimal investments in general. For
example, practitioners’ approaches are more of ‘satisficing’ rather than ‘optimizing’ in nature.
This paper provides methodological steps towards an integrated economic model that could seek
jointly optimal investment behavior of a firm between its prevention and detection regimes of
information system security management.
Keywords: IT security, IT security economic model, aggregate model, optimal IT security investment

Introduction
Security of information assets is a priority for most organizations today. Governmental regulations, customer
expectations, and competitive forces all point towards further heightening of the need for adequate security of
information systems. Technology and managerial issues combined; there is an apparent 2-step approach in the way
an organization tends to address its information security issues.
First, organizations embrace an adequate security policy/program, train and educate its employees/users, incorporate
access control, employ firewall and other network hardening devices, and encrypt communication and storage of
data. These measures reduce the probability of compromise of the organization’s information assets, given an attack
from a malevolent entity. In this work, we designate it as the prevention regime.
Second, organizations also employ IDS (intrusion detection system) which analyze the behavior of a user in the
information system (at the host server or network, as the case may be), and in case of anomalies in expected
behavior/ risky or unwanted behavior, raise an alarm – upon which the administer (or the system itself) may eject
the user (session termination/user isolation), or in certain situations, shutdown/isolate part or whole information
system. We refer this as the detection regime.
The aggregate/combined level of success of this 2-step approach is however complicated by the interdependence of
the (successes of the) measures at each step. Assuming that no preemptive measures could be taken to alter the
behavior of a malevolent entity (who are immensely numerous anyway), managing the prior probability of an attack
on an organization’s information system is generally beyond the feasible scope of an information security program.
The first practicable concern (and hence the intended control point as well) for an organization revolves around
managing the success of an attack on its information system. This is manifested in the actions taken by the
organization in the first step, which results in a managed probability regime (manifested in the residual IT security
risk of the firm) that is commensurate with the accepted risk profile (posture) of the organization. In essence,
managed probability of success of an attack then becomes the prior probability of an intrusion in the system, and
defines the environment/paradigm of the intrusion detection management system that is to be in place.
However, the decision to eject a user or isolate/shut down a system depends on the posterior probability from the
IDS, which may or may not bear a linear relationship with its prior (combined effect of false positive and false
negatives). Moreover, with higher investment in prevention regime, the managed prior is lower, which makes an
IDS alarm to be heeded with less concern (tantamount to an addition to the IDS’s systemic false positive pool), and
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an absence of an alarm to be relied with higher confidence (a theoretical addition to the IDS’s systemic ‘false
negative’ pool), both of which potentially lessen the efficacy of the IDS system. In the dual dimension, the fact that
a downstream intrusion detection system is in place (a second line of defense), investment in step-1 could
experience moderating effects as well. The cyclic nature of these effects allude to the need of a combined decision
framework in which the investment decisions in both the steps could be coordinated for the overall optimal level of
information security that an organization may strive to achieve.
The following questions are important to consider in the above scenario of integrated decision making process:
1.

How should an organization allocate/apportion funds such that an optimal level of security is achieved in
the prevention (managed probability) regime?
Given a prevention/hardening scheme is in place, what is a minimum schedule (cost vs. level of
efficiency) that an IDS must offer in order to justify its inclusion in the security initiative of an
organization?
Given a coordinated investment regime, what are the systemic factors that could modify investment in
either of the approaches?
If a firm internalizes its decision of perimeter hardening while operationalizing an IDS scheme, how do
the investments differ from the above?

2.
3.
4.

Although most large organizations invest in both the above, there appears to be no extant aggregate planning
approach to coordinate the optimal investments between these steps of information security technologies.
The most accepted approach in practice, centered on the metric ROSI, is an accounting approach and is
predominantly satisficing in nature. Like ROI, ROSI implicitly requires a comparison framework - be it a
framework of competing technologies or initiatives, or against an organizational hurdle rate of (risk adjusted) return.
If the framework is comparative, ROSI is utilized to arrive at the best investment decision given the set of competing
possibilities/options. On the other hand, the hurdle rate for IT security projects may be a (organization specific)
general hurdle rate, or a benchmarked or baselined ROSI, which are again subsets of selection. In essence,
accounting methods of investment decision (e.g. ROI and ROSI) tend to justify (or not) the given costs of a
technology or initiative (and also among other competing possibilities), when the expected benefits are known in
relation to the organization’s internal and environmental business parameters. This process is tantamount to a
bounded rational behavior and would not ensure an optimal overall level of investment in IT security initiatives.
On the other hand, academic researchers and theoreticians have focused on economically optimal levels of a firm’s
security investment in mainly 3 categories:
1.

Where the firm’s security investment is composite but independent (Heal et al., 2003),

2

Where firm’s security decision is interdependent yet composite (Gordon et al., 2000), and

3

Where firm’s security investment decisions are coordinated in two different regimes - those of
technological and financial instruments (Gordon et al., 2003, and Ogut et al., 2004).

In contrast to the practitioners’ approach, this research attempts to find a model that could derive the optimal
investment level for the organization in the true economically rational sense.
As against the above streams of academic and theoretical research, this research concentrates in the firm’s
investment in the technology instruments (financial instruments have not been much popular in IT risk management
yet), but instead of treating the technology investment in a composite manner, separates the prevention (perimeter
hardening) and detection (IDS schemes) in a two step integrated process, such that available technology budget of
the firm could be judiciously allocated between them.
This is an ongoing research, and this initial report explains the development of the proposed (integrated) model and
its justification in the light of joint optimality of security investment decisions between the prevention (hardening)
and detection regimes. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section-2 describes our basic assumptions, and
develops the integrated model of investment decisions between prevention and detection regimes. This section also
provides some initial observations on investment decisions. Section-3 develops a numerical example to illustrate the
relative levels of investments. Section-4 discusses proposed future work and concludes this report.
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Assumptions, Model Development, and Initial Observations
Assumptions
We assume (without any loss in generality) that there exists one unique technology each for prevention and Intrusion
Detection. We also assume that decision of investment in prevention is a continuous decision (a pervasive
organizational effort with higher flexibilities) whereas the decision to invest in IDS is a discreet choice (single or
multiple binary choices, network or host level technical implementation)

Model development
The model is developed through the following 3 progressive cases:
Case - I
This is the body of the paper. Suppose that the prevention technology provides an efficacy that is mapped through a
firm specific (TTF1) technology transfer function, p(c h ) as depicted in figure-1. Thus if the firm invests ch in its
prevention regime, the post investment probability that a hacker/unauthorized user would succeed to compromise
the information assets is p (c h ) . The above assumption is consistent with standard economic prudence of
diminishing marginal return from the IT security investment. The TTF is assumed convex, and hence all convexity
assumptions in IT investment apply as well: p ′(c ) ≤ 0, p ′′(c ) ≥ 0 . In absence of any investment by the firm (given
an attempt), the unauthorized user is expected to be successful in compromising the firm’s information asset with
certainty: p (0) = 1 . On the other extreme, the above TTF is asymptotic to the investment axis, and implements the
fact that with our current level of prevention technology, no finite investment may ensure complete impenetrability:
p ( Ψ ) = 0, iff Ψ → ∞ .
1

TTF

Probability of
compromise
p(c)
0

Security investment ch

Figure1. Technology Transfer Function (TTF) of security investment
We will also assume that if an attack is successful, a total loss of
the following expression:

Max (− c

h

− p (c h ) L )

L is incurred to the firm. The firm now optimizes

…………………………………………………………………………

(1)

ch

The optimal investment for the firm is given by the first order condition of (1), thus the firm invests:
c h * = p ′ −1 − 1 . This result is simple and intuitive: when a firm has higher loss expectancy L, its optimal level of

(

L

)

investment in security increases monotonically.

1

Some conceptual detail of the TTF has been provided while describing the numerical example.
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Case - II
When the firm also invests in detection technology, it achieves a second level of protection over and above the
managed probability regime of case-1. Assuming that the cost of an IDS regime2 is c i : given an unauthorized user
in the firm’s network, the ID system identifies the intruder with a probability q . Knowing that the IDS works on top
of the managed probability regime, the firm now optimizes the following3:

Max (− c

− ci − p (c h , i ) (0 + (1 − q ) L )

h, i

……………..……………………………….

(2)

ch , i

⎞ . Noticing
As before, the optimal investment in prevention is arrived from the FOC of (2): c h ,i * = p ′ −1 ⎛⎜ − 1
(1 − q ) L ⎟⎠
⎝
that 1 ≥ q ≥ 0 , it is apparent that the optimal level of investment in perimeter hardening is now lower with IDS than
without. Intuitively, in presence of a second line of defense, the optimal investment in perimeter security drops from
case-1 to case-2. Figure-2 depicts this change in the optimal investment in network hardening. The FOCs of (1) and
(2) yield p ′(c h *) and p ′(c h , *) , which, once projected on to the (TTF) acceleration curve p ′(c) yield the optimal
i

investments ch * and c h ,i * , and their corresponding optimal probabilities p(c h *) and p (c h , i *) : the arrowheads are
drawn in a consistent fashion to facilitate understanding of the above.

p (c)
p(ch,i*)

ch,i *

ch *

p(ch*)
c

p΄(ch*)
p΄(ch,i*)
p΄(c)

Figure2. Optimal Investment in hardening (implicit form)

Finally, the firm decides to implement an ID system over and above its prevention regime only when the cost of
available IDS conforms to the following relation:

(

ci ≤ p ′ −1 − 1

L

)− p′

−1

⎛⎜ − 1
⎞
(1 − q ) L ⎟⎠
⎝

…………………………………………………

(3)

Sub-case - IIA: In case there exist competing products/technology of IDS, or there are j options in terms of depth
and breadth of implementation of IDS, a schedule of the cost-efficiency couples (ci j , q j ) of the detection schemes

can be drawn, and the final selection could be optimally made from the following:
⎧⎡

Min ⎨⎢c
j

⎩⎣

ij

⎛
⎞⎤ ⎫
+ p ′ −1 ⎜ − 1
⎟⎥ ⎬
−
(
1
q
)
L
j
⎝
⎠⎦ ⎭

(

subject to : ci j ≤ p ′ −1 − 1

2
3

L

) − p′

−1

………..…………….………...………….…..

(4)

⎛ 1
⎞
⎜ − (1 − q ) L ⎟
j
⎠
⎝

The assumed cost is composite of procurement and operation of the IDS system in general.
c h ,i is the investment of the firm when investment in prevention necessary is associated with that in IDS.
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Case - III

A Closer look at the IDS paradigm, however, warrants further refinement. An IDS generally needs added
interventions in view of its innate operating problems known as ‘false positives’ and ‘false negatives’. This calls for
a moderation of our assumed (efficiency) notation q, and we bring that moderation in the following fashion:
We assume that a) given an intrusion, the IDS (rightly) provides an alarm with a probability q, and b) given no
intrusion, the IDS (falsely) provides alarm with a probability r. Because an alarm requires further
investigation/action by the firm personnel, a false alarm is nonetheless costly (l), although the information assets of
the firm are not compromised (we initially internalize this is a system loss, and not an operational cost, which we
have included in our composite cost of the IDS, ci). On the other hand, if the IDS fails to provide an alarm when an
intruder is in the network, we assume that the loss of information asset is, as before, L.
Under the modified assumptions and loss/cost structures, the expected loss of the firm is now modified
to p(ch, i ) {q.l + (1 − q) L}+ (1 − p){r.l + 0} , and the firm now solves the following:

(

)

Max (− c

h, i

− ci − p (ch , i ) {q.l + (1 − q ) L} − (1 − p ){r.l + 0}) ……………………..………………………

(5)

ch , i

Again, the FOC of (3) yields the modified optimal investment in prevention technology of the firm:
m

⎞
c h ,i * = p ′ −1 ⎛⎜ − 1
{(1 − q) L + (q − r ). l}⎟⎠ , where the superscript m highlights the currently modified structure of
⎝

the problem.

Initial observations
Comparing

m

ch ,i * with c h ,i * , the following observations are in order now:

Observation - I

As for all practical purposes the operating characteristics of the IDS must ensure q > r (else any randomizing
device could replace our IDS!),

m

c h ,i * > c h ,i * . Clearly, investigation related losses of false positive alarms

adversely affect the efficacy of the IDS, and the firm tends to invest proportionally more in perimeter security now.
Note that the treatment of investigation cost ‘l’ as a system loss is important here - the firm may exercise control in
tuning its IDS (q and r), and thus the internalization of this effect as a loss is more apt than considering it as a cost.
Observation - II

So long L > l, even with the problems of false positive and false negative in the IDS operations, the investment in
perimeter security in the combined regime remains strictly lower than the managed probability regime: ∀L > l , the
required precondition ⎡(q − r ) ⎤ ≥ L is absurd.
⎢⎣

q ⎥⎦

l

Observation - III

Using

m

ch ,i * as an analog of c h ,i * in to (3) and (4) yield the decisional criteria for selection and procurement

decision of an IDS in view of the innate problem of false positive and false negative of an IDS.

Numerical Example
In order to augment appreciation of the problem of joint optimization (the analysis is in implicit form,) here we
present a numerical example to highlight the differences in investments under the three different cases. Suppose that
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− kc

the prevention technology TTF is given by p = e
where k is a firm specific factor (a higher value of k achieves
higher benefit from the same investment c for a firm, and could depend on the security readiness of the firm, and its
current level of maturity in pertinent learning curves).
Thus, p ' = − kp , and the optimal investments are listed as below:

ch * =

Ln(LK )
Ln(LK (1 − q ) )
, c hi * =
,
K
K

m

c hi * =

Ln{LK (1 − q) + lK (q − r )} .
K

Thus, if L = $1000, K = 0.01, l = $10, q = 0.8, r = 0.2 , the following values of the optimal investment
in perimeter technology could be compared: c h * = $230, c hi * = $69, m c hi * = $72 .
Clearly, any IDS scheme which cost between $158 and $161 is no longer feasible for the firm when the
idiosyncratic problems of an IDS are considered.

Limitations, Future Work, and Concluding Remarks
My goal in this research is to internalize the firm’s investment decisions of prevention and detection technologies in
an interdependent fashion, such that a more complete joint optimization of the hitherto disparate decisions could be
examined. This work is in its very initial phase, and the current internalization of investment effect interdependency
is through the losses from the false positive alarms of the IDs. This is a definite limitation of the research in its
current stage, although even this simple internalization has provided some important observations. I propose to
further internalize the investment interdependency by making both q and r functions of the investment decision of
the firm in its prevention regime i.e. q = q(ch,i) and r = r(ch,i). This internalization will not only bring out the optimal
investments in prevention and detection regimes, it will also likely calibrate the firm’s most advantageous tuning of
the implemented IDS. This proposed approach is however challenged by a possible complication of the
mathematical analysis of the model. In such case, I envision a partial mathematical solution augmented by a
thorough numerical analysis which could bring out the insights in an effective fashion.
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